In the late 1960s, significant oil deposits were discovered beneath the Ecuadorian Amazon Basin. By 1972, these deposits had begun to provide a steady flow of petrodollars into the country’s struggling economy. Aided by significant positive shocks to the international market, this influx of oil-revenues, which continued throughout most of the decade, effectively facilitated the largest economic boom in Ecuador’s history; an unprecedented upward surge in (short-term) economic prosperity that fostered high hopes for long-term, sustained development. However, only a decade later, it became apparent that such faith in the boom’s longevity had been deceiving. Though oil had allowed for economic self-sufficiency, instead of creating policies promoting long-term economic development, the government began a period of massive public spending. Ecuador’s short-sightedness (reflected in the government’s economic policies) allowed the country to extend beyond the means of its petrodollars. Overspending soon necessitated massive borrowing from international lenders. The re-allocation of oil-revenues towards serving debt, coupled with significant drops in the price of oil, sent Ecuador into a state of economic crisis eventually forcing it into the hands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A further decade of IMF-imposed economic austerity only worsened Ecuador’s situation, pushing the country to the very brink of total collapse. In 2000, Dollarization saved Ecuador from certain doom. The linking of the Ecuadorian economy to that of the US (through shared use of the US Dollar) had a stabilizing effect, putting an end to the debilitating economic issues of the 80s that had been exacerbated by IMF policies.
This paper will discuss in detail, characteristics of the Ecuadorian economy and historic developments in the country’s political landscape, as well as the Oil Crisis of the early 1970s and IMF policy of the 1980s and 1990s. The intent of providing such information is to facilitate an understanding of the true causes of Ecuador’s post-colonial history of increasingly-worse economic crises, culminating at the end of the 20th century with the country’s official dollarization. Though certainly exacerbated by the neo-liberal policies of the IMF, the roots of Ecuador’s pattern of recurrent crises are found early in its history, with the emergence of populism in the late 1930s. José Maria Velasco Ibarra, Ecuador’s first proponent of populism, instilled within the country’s political system a weakly-rooted, unstable, clientelist, corrupt form of governance. Carried on by his successors, Ibarra’s brand of Latin American populism has effectively discouraged policies promoting sustained long-term economic development. Such politics have facilitated the persistent inability of Ecuador’s leaders to decrease the country’s dependency on Commodity-exports because of the political-necessity to maintain popular support. Thus, Ecuadorian populism serves as the primary cause of Ecuador’s economic issues throughout the 20th century.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Ecuadorian economy has been heavily reliant on a limited number of export-commodities, though it has tended to become overly-dependent on the export-revenues accrued from its one, most profitable good. Over time, the country’s chief export has changed; beginning with Cacao (the source of cocoa) in the late 19th century, shifting to bananas in the 1950s, and then to oil from the late 60s to early 70s. Its history of ‘reliance on primary commodity exports has subjected Ecuador, like many other Latin American economies, to debilitating boom-and-bust cycles.’ Fluctuations in, and shocks to the international market price of one or more of its limited exports (primarily its chief export) dramatically affect its economic prosperity. The volatility of Ecuador’s economy is not limited to changes in world commodity markets; nature also plays a significant role in the country’s success and failure. Ecuador “is prone to earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, and extended periods of both drought and excessive rain” In the 1990s, both economic (drop in the price of oil) and natural (El Niño’s destruction of the coast) shocks contributed to pushing the Ecuadorian economy into a tailspin ending in 2000, with the country’s official dollarization.
The Great Depression also emphasized the susceptibility of Ecuador’s commodity-dependent economy to both world market fluctuations and acts of nature. Ecuador, due to its limited methods of economic production, was hit particularly hard as “the country’s major exports experienced a dramatic decline in terms of both demand and international market prices.” The revenues from the country’s (then) chief-export, Cacao, “fell from US $15 million in 1928, to US $7 million in 1931, and US $5 million in 1932;” its fall rising not only from decreased demand in the ailing global economy, but also from the destruction of half the exportable quantity by a rare fungus. Substantially-decreased economic production led to massive wage decreases and soaring levels of unemployment, casting the vast majority of the Ecuador’s labor and peasantry into lives of abject poverty and life-threatening malnutrition. “The economic crisis and widespread popular mobilization sparked off during the early and mid-1930s provided the opportunity for a charismatic populist leader to emerge.” The election of José Maria Velasco Ibarra in 1934 marked the rise of a new political ideology. Appealing to and garnering the support of Ecuador’s poor, Ibarra was the first in a series of leaders to espouse populism and its ideals as a means of gaining power through mass-mobilization.
Classic Latin American populist politics is based on the mass-appeal of charismatic leaders. As described by Carlos de la Torre, Populist leaders identify themselves with the people through “a rhetoric that constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between el pueblo and the oligarchy.” Such rhetoric identifies ‘el pueblo’ as everyone and everything other than the oligarchy; everything that is good, moral, and just. The success of populist leaders comes not from logically-sound arguments, but from their ability to appeal to popular emotions; espousing a shared hatred of the liberal oligarchy and its marginalization of the people as means of mobilizing the masses in their support. Frequently assuming Authoritarian roles, leaders use their popularity amongst the masses as a method of political intimidation, sometimes encouraging mob-rule and street violence to ensure continued state control.
A regimes control over the state is also largely dependent on the continued support of the people. Populists form alliances between the state and various social organizations through clientelist systems, which can be best be described as mechanisms (bureaucracies) that facilitate the exchange of state-funds or beneficial policies in return for votes and political allegiance. Though Ecuador’s case is arguably unique , Latin American populism (in general), can be related to and explained by the growth strategy of Import-substitution Industrialization (ISI). Similar to the central ideal of populism, ISI calls for a strong and interventionist state. Its inward-facing policies promote the development of domestic “infant” industries through protectionist measures (i.e. tariffs and subsidies) intended to prevent foreign competition. Ideally, this allows domestic industries to develop local substitutes for previously imported items. Its promotion of domestic economic activity makes ISI attractive to populist leaders who can use it to garner increased support.
In May 1944, José Maria Velasco Ibarra reentered Ecuadorian politics on the back of revolution. Having been ousted from his first presidential term, “La Revolución Gloriosa” facilitated Ibarra’s rise to power as Ecuador’s first populist president. Embodying the characteristics of classic populism, his rhetoric personalized the struggle of the people (el pueblo) against the liberal oligarchs (a battle of good versus evil) and presented Ibarra as the embodiment of redemption over the corrupt, fraudulent liberal political system. His encompassment of the “will of the people” made him unaccountable to any political system, institutions for which he showed great contempt; sometimes dismissing competition altogether through rejection of the constitution and assumption of dictatorial powers.
Though Ibarra’s movement was responsible for the introduction of politics of mass-incorporation in Ecuador, “Velasquismo” (the political movement that was to carry on his style of leadership), espoused “a political style that could provide only weak, unstable, and ineffective governance for Ecuador.” From Ibarra’s rise, the country would see a system of government characterized by corrupt practices and overwhelming dependence on mass-support; this political dependency would play a significant role in the country’s future economic crises.
In 1971, The US took the Dollar off the Gold Standard (which had pegged the value of the Dollar to the price of gold), allowing it to “float;” signifying that the market would be a large determinant of a currency’s value in relation to other currencies. Too much strain had been put on the previous system of fixed exchange rates that did not allow currencies sufficient movement to adjust for value fluctuations in the global economy. Ideally, a system of floating exchange rates would allow currencies to adjust “frequently in response to market conditions as well as to government intervention.” Other Industrialized nations soon followed suit. Anticipating great fluctuations in the value of their currencies as they moved to re-stabilize against each other, these countries moved to increase their level of reserves in US dollars. The massive buy up of dollars by developed nations caused depreciation in the currency’s value.
Because oil was priced in dollars, depreciation in the dollar signified less “real” income for the exports of oil-producing nations. In response to decreased oil-revenues, the support of Israel (during the Yom Kippur War) by the United States and other Western nations, and a desire to regain control of their exports, on October 16th, 1973, the major members of OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) declared massive reductions in oil-production as well as embargos on the export of oil to Israel’s supporters. OAPEC successfully facilitated a substantial increase in the price of oil (rising from $2.48 in October, to $11.65 in December), and created massive shortages throughout much of the West. In doing so, Arab oil-producers successfully caused world-wide economic turmoil, and the creation of the first global oil crisis. Because oil-related issues were rooted in the Persian Gulf, there was a surge in demand for the petroleum exports of countries outside the region. This all but guaranteed that Ecuador, having seen the successful completion of its first pipeline a year earlier, would soon experience an unprecedented economic boom as the “black gold” of the Amazon proved far more lucrative than any of the country’s previous exports.
Ecuador’s military had been largely responsible for the concessions granted to Texaco, which had led to the discovery of the country’s oil-reserves. The generals were aware of the great quantities of oil that were going to be exported from the country during the 1970s as well as the incredible flow of petrodollars into Ecuador; “80% of which, would fall under state control.” Members of the military feared that the country’s petrodollars, if left in the hands of populists like Ibarra, “would disappear in a whirlwind of corruption, incompetence, and clientelism.” In February of 1972, with the aim of preventing oil-revenues from falling into the hands of Ecuador’s corrupt leader, the military carried out a coup d’état, successfully forcing the despotic president from power and allowing a new nationalist military tribunal to take control of the state.
By the early 1970s, the failure of ISI to generate sustained long-term economic growth as well as Ecuador’s ever-increasing stockpile of oil-revenues encouraged the military-led government to shift the focus of the country’s development towards the export of petroleum. The theory behind this shift was Export-oriented growth, which suggested that the best method of stimulating growth was through the investment of revenues accrued from the export of a good or goods for which a country has the comparative advantage. It promoted the elimination of trade barriers and the opening of the domestic economy to foreign investment and competition in return for access to foreign markets (to which goods could be exported). Although Ecuador moved to re-orient its economy around the export of oil, the government continued to play a strong, active role in the economy, facilitating the continued existence of protectionist economic policies left over from ISI.
In 1973, Ecuador became a member-nation of OPEC. With a firm belief that the country’s new economic boom was to continue indefinitely, the newly-appointed nationalist military junta began to use oil-revenues to facilitate massive public spending. Petrodollars were allocated towards the development of infrastructure, with the aim of encouraging foreign investment outside of the agricultural sector and extractive industries. The government was successful in facilitating increased foreign investment in non-agricultural/extractive sectors, the level of which increased from $60 million in 1970, to $250 million by 1976. However, poor management, a small domestic demand, and the capital-intensive nature of new manufacturing activities, limited the positive effects. Mounting pressure was put on the government by special-interest groups and the urban poor (who had grown accustomed to the spoils of populism) to increase public social spending. In fear of alienating the easily-mobilized masses, the state gave in to populist sentiment and began channeling funds to various lobbies as well as to the formation of substantial subsidies on basic food items and energy, targeted at benefiting the country’s poorest inhabitants.
By the mid-1970s, it was apparent that the governments massive spending on infrastructure was seeing little positive results. The middle and upper classes were the benefactors of increased economic activity, using their new-found wealth to facilitate increased imports of luxury items. Meanwhile, the level of poverty amongst the country’s poor continued to rise. Three-quarters of the rural population was living under the poverty line while the urban informal sector saw an increase from 45% to 55% during military control. The government’s support of its ineffective and increasingly-expensive subsidization programs (50% of government Budget by 1978), in addition to the vast amount of finances it dedicated to satisfying various unions and other civil organizations, increased public expenditure to such an extent that the country’s substantial oil-revenues were no longer sufficient to finance it. To continue its expensive social-initiatives, Ecuador was forced to seek loans from international lenders. The country’s debt service on external loans, given as a percentage of export revenues, grew from 10% in 1971 to 60% in 1979; by 1982, 90% of Ecuador’s export-revenues (primarily in petrodollars) were allocated towards servicing its massive debt. In 1979, its popularity eroded by the gradual breakdown of the economy, Ecuador’s military regime put power back in civilian hands.
Ecuador’s oil-boom, constituting the brief period between 1972 and 1979, effectively illustrates the enduring influence of Ibarra’s populist rhetoric on the country’s economic development. Ibarra delegated to the military-led government, the responsibility of appeasing the popular will of an urban population that had grown accustomed to his gross-misappropriation of state funds to serving their interests. Though the military regime had entered the decade on the promise of significant reform and development, funding for infrastructure and non-agricultural/extractive foreign investment was cut short by increasing pressures from organizations that had previously been the beneficiaries of the clientelist system under populist leadership. This prevented the government from further investment into the means of production, which might have provided for decreased costs and increased efficiency in new manufacturing activities. The ineffectiveness of public spending to create successful new industries effectively prevented the government from facilitating diversification of the domestic economy and decreased dependence on the export of the country’s volatile commodities. In actuality, Ecuador’s commodity-dependence (specifically in regards to oil) increased, as revenues used to finance the government’s substantial public expenditure were reallocated to servicing the country’s increasing debt.
In 1979, Jaime Roldós, representing the last leader to embody classic populism in Ecuador, won the presidency on a platform of social reform. His first year coincided with the last year of Ecuador’s oil-boom. As a result of dramatic increases in the price of oil, Roldós’ regime experienced initial success. He was able to garner support by using the country’s final high oil-revenues to finance wage increases and subsidize domestic industries. However, despite early success, growing economic instability prevented Roldós from creating alliances in support of his further political agenda. His early death in an airplane crash in 1981 marked the beginning of a shift in Ecuadorian politics. Subsequent drops in the price of oil between 1982 and 1984, combined with Ecuador’s massive debt-service requirements and the reality that non-oil exports provided only very modest revenues, the country was left without the financial resources necessary to foster a domestic resolution to the emerging economic crisis. Left with no other alternative, Ecuador was forced to seek loans from the IMF. The adoption of the IMF’s austerity measures or, “structural adjustments” and their collision with the country’s historically-rooted populist political ideology had important implications for the country’s future.
As the world entered the 1980s, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the industrialized world’s new leaders and major proponents of “free-market” economics, promoted the ideals of neo-liberalism as the solution to the developing-world’s economic woes. The IMF of the 1980s became the catalyst for the spread of free-market ideology throughout all corners of the globe; liberal policies became preconditions for IMF loans to indebted Third World countries. These “structural adjustments” promoted austere fiscal and monetary practices designed to, “generate savings and foreign exchange with which to bring countries’ internal and external accounts into balance and facilitate the repayment of their foreign creditors.” The IMF promoted economic liberalization through the elimination of tariffs, subsidies, and other barriers to trade (such as price controls); deregulation, privatization of state-owned enterprises and utilities, and substantially-decreased public social-spending. Great contradiction rose between the “minimalist” state promoted by these policies and the strong, interventionist state that was central to Ecuador’s populist Ideology. As subsequent leaders attempted to combine the IMF’s contradictory neo-liberal policies with Ecuador’s populist traditions, great issues emerged.
The inherent weakness of the country’s brand of populism (inspired by Velasco Ibarra) was derived from the severe domestic limitations associated with the system. Ecuador’s populism lacked any-semblance of a strong ideology, and progress was often hampered by struggle between factions within the party itself (primarily between those in the coast and those in the sierra). This combined “with increasing mobilization of the popular sectors” whom the populist system relied on for support, “generated a permanent crisis of governance.”
Leaders were unable to garner adequate support for their agendas even from within their own parties. Elected largely due to their promises to revive populist social programs (such as basic subsidies on food and cooking-fuel), regimes were forced to walk a thin line between maintaining the popular-support they were dependent on and achieving the reductions in public expenditure required by the IMF. Though Ecuador was obligated to re-allocate all of its finances towards ongoing economic liberalization and debt service, the country’s populace, accustomed to a populist system, felt abandoned. Frequent eruptions of widespread popular-protest forced the government to abandon the macroeconomic policies that it had agreed to abide by. This inability to adequately address any of the country’s social or macroeconomic issues served as fuel for the growing disillusionment of the masses with the country’s elected officials; disillusionment which led to increased unrest and popular-protest; at of the frequent coups of the late-1990s and early 2000s.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the rhetoric of populism contributed significantly to its continued existence in Ecuadorian politics despite the contradictory nature presented in the neo-liberal policies that the country’s leaders attempted to mesh with the imbedded ideology. In 1984, Leon Febres Cordero, among others, used strong rhetoric during his presidential campaign promising “Techo, Comida, y Trabajo” , (Shelter, Food, and Work) to the poor, despite the fact that he would fail to provide them any of the three. The brunt of the social costs incurred from neo-liberal economic transformation was experienced by Ecuador’s poorest citizens; the massive rise in unemployment caused by the elimination of barriers that had previously (under ISI) protected domestic manufacturing and from the loss of 35,000 public jobs (under subsequent administrations), result of legislation making the privatization of state-enterprises possible; and the sharp rise in food and fuel prices after the removal of long-existing and essential price controls.
In addition to fueling the rapid degradation of the lives of the country’s poor, Ecuador’s economic liberalization increased its dependency on volatile commodity-exports. After a sustained period of relative economic diversification (compared to years prior and after) during the oil-boom of the 1970s, “free-market” policies effectively caused a, “reprimarization” of the economy; a return to over-dependence on primary exports after the country had experienced some success in its state-protected domestic manufacturing. Between 1980 and 1990, export-revenues from manufactured goods declined more than 40%, from US$626 million to US$367 million. During the same period, commodity exports increased 2.7%, from US$1.85 billion to US$2.34 billion. This fall in manufacture exports and rise in commodity exports occurred at a time when world trade of manufactured goods was growing three times as fast as trade in primary goods. Ecuador’s pattern of trade facilitated intensified exploitation of the country’s natural resources. The ratio of debt to total export-revenues rose from 183% in 1980 to 490% in 1990. The regression of the Ecuadorian economy towards commodity-based, export-led growth produced restraints on small- and medium-scale business, while it strengthened large enterprises whose investment per worker increased 50% from 1992 to 1997; large export-based firms consolidated finances and failed to generate increased employment opportunities. The same period saw the closer of massive amounts of micro, small, and medium-sized businesses. From 1990-1996, 4,600 businesses went bankrupt. By 1999, Ecuador’s level of unemployment reached 14.4%, though it was less than 5% for the richest 20 percent of the population, and 24% for the poorest 20 percent. At the same time, underemployment stood at 50%.
The dramatic effects of IMF-imposed macroeconomic austerity made it increasingly difficult for Ecuador’s populist leaders to remain in good favor with an evermore-impoverished popular sector. As the data illustrates, nearly all costs associated with neo-liberal transitions towards a “free-market” were borne by Ecuador’s middle- and lower-classes. This facilitated an even greater disparity in the concentration of wealth. In 1999, Ecuador had the thirteenth-worst distribution of wealth of the 97 countries in the World Bank’s World Development Report 1999. Strong rhetoric of popular-reform consolidated presidential administrations into the mid-1990s, though the permanent and worsening economic-crisis prevented any social reform from taking place. The gap between the populist ideology espoused by Ecuador’s leaders and the lack of results they produced became increasingly-apparent. Disenchantment with the empty words of the country’s leadership and increasingly-impoverished living conditions led to a sharp rise in popular-mobilization towards the end of the decade as the country neared economic collapse.
On January 9th 2000, Ecuador adopted the US dollar as the national currency. By 1999, the countries (then) national currency, the sucre, had reached a state of hyperinflation. Years of poor economic policy and weak governance at the hands of the International Monetary Fund and its tools of “stabilization” had left Ecuador near disrepair. Rampant inflation, soaring interest rates, the collapse of the banking sector, the ever-increasing ratio of debt-service to total export-revenues; causes of the massive economic transition, were all facilitated by the IMF and its near-twenty year stranglehold on the country. However, similar to the other causes of dollarization, specifically: the domestic market’s dependence on the export of primary commodities (it experienced significant drops in the international-market price of oil) and its susceptibility to natural disasters (the devastation of El Niño in 1997); the causes of Ecuador’s economic woes were not the result of the IMF’s neo-liberal presence. The roots of the pre-dollarization crisis are found much earlier in the country’s history, with the rise of populism and the politics of mass-incorporation.
Coming to power for a brief period in the late-1930s and rising to prominence in 1944, José Maria Velasco Ibarra introduced his personal interpretation of Latin American populism into Ecuador’s political landscape. Using his strong charisma, he mobilized the masses in his support. He embodied their struggle against the corrupt Liberal oligarchy, which had to that point maintained a stranglehold on Ecuador’s political system; a system that had been based upon the mass-exclusion and marginalization of the popular masses. Embodying “el pueblo” the people, representing all that was good, honest, and just; Ibarra declared to his followers that he would rise above the political system and would lead the country as the will of the people dictated. Assuming authoritarian powers, Ibarra facilitated the mass-mobilization of the people, the first politician to address them in public spaces; he used them as means of intimidating the opposition, asserting dominance over the political system for nearly forty years. Though he was ousted in 1972 by a Military junta, tired of his brand of leadership; Velasquismo, the embodiment of his political ideology, would be instilled in Ecuadorian politics throughout the rest of the 20th century. Velasquismo represented a largely corrupt political style, based on the ability to appeal to and gain the support of the masses. Continued allegiance was facilitated through a clientelist system, which exchanged votes and political support in return for the support (whether monetarily or through policy) of the state. Lacking a true ideological-basis, the populism espoused by Velasquismo necessitated the successful continuation of clientelist relations with the popular masses. Throughout Ibarra’s reign, Ecuador’s populace would grow accustomed to the spoils of such a system; manifesting in a continued demand for the misappropriation of funds towards meeting popular goals, a mainstay of future Ecuadorian politics.
Ibarra’s populism had great effect on the leadership of his military ousters. Presiding over Ecuador during its ten year oil-boom, the military junta would be remembered for its massive public expenditure, which by mid-decade extended beyond the great financial capability offered by Ecuador’s inflow of petrodollars. The junta borrowed heavily from international lenders to finance its increasingly-expensive political agenda. State funds were reallocated to servicing the country’s increasing level of debt. Because of the country’s overwhelming dependence on commodity-exports, drops in the price of oil made it increasingly-difficult to repay its lenders, and by 1984, Ecuador was forced to turn to the IMF for help. The 1980s and 1990s were characterized by subsequent political regimes and their attempts to combine the neo-liberal policies of the IMF with the country’s historically-rooted populist-practices. The contradictory nature of politics emerging from this marriage of strange bedfellows prevented the government from either, responding to Ecuador’s myriad social issues, or achieving the austere “structural adjustments” of the IMF. These neo-liberal policies only exacerbated the economic crisis that had begun with the military’s overspending in the 1970s, overspending necessitated to maintain the continued support of the popular sector; a compulsory process instilled in Ecuador’s political system by the country’s first proponent of populism, José Maria Velasco Ibarra.
Ecuador now stands at an important juncture. Years after the US invasion of Iraq, the world is again seeing a steady increase in the price of oil. Ecuador, ever-more dependent upon the export of its prized natural resource and chief commodity, is enjoying an increase in export-revenues. Having recently elected a Socialist regime under president, Rafael Correa, the country has stated that it no longer intends to repay- or, impose the neo-liberal policies of- the IMF. Having failed, in the 1970s, to design policies reflecting goals of sustainable, long-term economic development, the Ecuadorian government now has the responsibility of “atoning” for past mistakes. The susceptibility of the economy to both international economic shocks and natural disasters necessitates that Ecuador move quickly towards economic diversification. If sustained development is to be achieved, the government can not give in to the same, deep-rooted populist ideology that doomed its predecessors. If Ecuador is to become less dependent on commodity export-revenues, its now increasing reserve of petrodollars must be used to facilitate the diversification of the economy. It must provide prolonged-sustainable levels of public revenues, before it can begin allocating substantial revenues to social needs. If Ecuador is truly intent on defying the International Monetary Fund and creating the means to achieve goals of self-development, policies drafted in the near future will be of utmost importance to the country’s success.
Notes
Paul Beckerman, Andrés Solimano, Crisis and Dollarization in Ecuador (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2002), p. 22.
Ibid, p. 25.
Jean Carrière, Neoliberalism, Economic Crisis and Popular Mobilization in Ecuador, ed. J Demmers, AE Fernandez Jilberto, and B Hogenboom (London: Zed Books LTD, 2001), p. 133.
Paul Beckerman, Andrés Solimano, Crisis and Dollarization in Ecuador (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2002), p. 23.
Jean Carrière, Neoliberalism, Economic Crisis and Popular Mobilization in Ecuador, ed. J Demmers, AE Fernandez Jilberto, and B Hogenboom (London: Zed Books LTD, 2001), p. 134.
Carlos de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience, (Ohio: Ohio University 2000), p. 4.
Ibid, p. 15, 17, 20.
Carlos de la Torre argues that there is no direct correlation between the rise of populism in Ecuador and the first period of Import-Substitution Industrialization (Torre: 2000).
Jolle Demmers, Alex E. Fernández Jilberto, and Barbara Hogenboom, The Transformation of Latin American Populism: Regional and Global Dimensions (London: Zed Books, 2001), p. 4.
Carlos de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience, (Ohio: Ohio University 2000), p. 28, 53, 78-79.
Jean Carrière, Neoliberalism, Economic Crisis and Popular Mobilization in Ecuador, ed. J Demmers, AE Fernandez Jilberto, and B Hogenboom (London: Zed Books LTD, 2001), p. 133.
Joan E. Spero and Jeffrey Hart, The Politics of International Economic Relations (California: Wadsworth, 2003), p. 13.
Ibid, p. 306.
Leslie Jermun, Ecuadorian oil, debt, and poverty: A True Story, http://www.globalaware.org/introduction_print.htm (December 2002).
Jean Carrière, Neoliberalism, Economic Crisis and Popular Mobilization in Ecuador, ed. J Demmers, AE Fernandez Jilberto, and B Hogenboom (London: Zed Books LTD, 2001), p. 135.
Ibid, p. 136.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 137.
Jean Carrière, Neoliberalism, Economic Crisis and Popular Mobilization in Ecuador, ed. J Demmers, AE Fernandez Jilberto, and B Hogenboom (London: Zed Books LTD, 2001), p. 136.
Ibid, p. 138.
Paul Beckerman, Andrés Solimano, Crisis and Dollarization in Ecuador (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2002), p. 41.
Jean Carrière, Neoliberalism, Economic Crisis and Popular Mobilization in Ecuador, ed. J Demmers, AE Fernandez Jilberto, and B Hogenboom (London: Zed Books LTD, 2001), p. 140.
Ibid.
SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty, and Inequality (New York: Zed Books, 2004), p. 1-2.
Jean Carrière, Neoliberalism, Economic Crisis and Popular Mobilization in Ecuador, ed. J Demmers, AE Fernandez Jilberto, and B Hogenboom (London: Zed Books LTD, 2001), p. 146.
Jean Carrière, Neoliberalism, Economic Crisis and Popular Mobilization in Ecuador, ed. J Demmers, AE Fernandez Jilberto, and B Hogenboom (London: Zed Books LTD, 2001), p. 146.
Ibid, p. 140, 143.
Ibid, p. 142.
Saprin, Structural Adjustment: The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty, and Inequality, (New York: Zed Books, 2004), p. 50.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 93.
Ibid, p. 98.
Ibid, p. 90.
Paul Beckerman, Andrés Solimano, Crisis and Dollarization in Ecuador (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2002), p. 3.
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The Politics of Empire 